








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# Introduction








#### Introduction

- ✓ Brief introduction to OpenSSL.
- ✓ Brief introduction to Intel SGX
- ✓ Smart solution: Anglave Data Vault (ADV)
- ✓ FIPS validation with certificate number #3672













- OpenSSL was founded in 1998 by Eric Andrew and Tim Hudson
  - ✓ It is an open source software library.
  - ✓ It provides cryptographic functionality to other applications.
  - ✓ The FIPS Object Module is based on OpenSSL and validated with certificates #1747, #2398 and #2473 allows other products to be also validated under different platforms.
  - ✓ The FIPS Object Module is compatible with OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.2 releases.



OpenSSL FIPS Object Module SE

Version 2.0.16
By
OpenSSL Validation Service

OpenSSL FIPS 140-2 Security Policy

Version 2.0.16

December 26, 2017






## Next Steps

- ✓ OpenSSL is working on the development of OpenSSL 3.0.0 and 3.0.0 FIPS Object Module.
- ✓ The main change is related to the inclusion of the "Providers Concept":
  - The Built-in provider that contains the OpenSSL implementation.
  - The legacy provider that enables access to legacy algorithms.
  - The FIPS provider that enables access to FIPS validated algorithms.









## Next Steps

✓ Once OpenSSL 3.0.0 and 3.0.0 FOM version are available, the support for OpenSSL 1.0.2 and FIPS Object Module 2.0 will be removed.



✓ This will require either to migrate to the newest version or to pay for a premium service (only extend support to OpenSSL 1.0.2).














- Introduction
  - ✓ Intel Software Guard Extension helps to protect data and code from disclosure and modification.
  - ✓ It allows the developers to partition their Apps into "enclaves" or trusted execution modules to increase the application security against:
    - External attacks
    - Malware








- Developing an Intel SGX application
  - ✓ An Intel SGX App is composed by and untrusted component and a trusted component where:
    - 1. The App in execution creates the enclave into the trusted memory.
    - 2. The trusted function into the enclave is called.
    - 3. The enclave sees and process all the data in clear.
    - 4. The enclave returns the result but its data remain in trusted memory.
    - 5. The App execution continues.
  - ✓ Important: Intel SGX prevent the access to the privileged region of memory by any other processes.

#### **Application**



OS, VMM, BIOS, etc.





- New Security Models
  - ✓ Intel SGX enhances security providing a higher level of isolation for program an data in some environments like:
    - 1. Key management
    - 2. Applications at runtime
    - 3. Enhanced Application and data protection
    - 4. Blockchain
    - 5. Communications








# Smart Solution: Integration of OpenSSL and Intel SGX













# Smart Solution: Integration of OpenSSL and Intel SGX

- Cryptographic operation of the module
  - ✓ IntelSGX already supports OpenSSL, so our key management solution is heavily based on OpenSSL
- Protection and management of keys, secrets, certificates etc.
  - ✓ Software key management solutions using OpenSSL is a common practice.
  - ✓ Using a dedicated HW to support HSMs is an expensive solution and wasn't designed for the cloud era.
  - ✓ IntelSGX provides a HW-grade protection using general purpose hardware (Intel CPUs)
  - ✓ The use of HW-grade TEE from key-generation to key usage





# Integration issues







# Integration issues

- Deciding which FIPS 140-2 level to apply for:
  - ✓ IntelSGX hardware? Show we go for Level 3?
  - ✓ To support level 2, only RedHat 7.1 has CC certification, but IntelSGX does not support RedHat yet, when we started the project
  - ✓ We wanted to have the flexibility as much of our use cases are related to the cloud and they wants to be HW and OS version agnostic
- Teams familiarity with FIPS- related algorithms
  - ✓ Had to spend a lot on reverse engineering
  - ✓ Deeper research about the algorithms instead of just porting






# Integration issues

- Designing how to draw boundaries in our existing APIs with FIPS algorithms
- SGXSSL version was for OpenSSL 1.1.0, while the FIPS module on OpenSSL is only compatible with OpenSSL 1.0.2
- √ Compiling issues
- ✓ Making SGXSSL compatible with OpenSSL 1.0.2 vs. Make FIPS OpenSSL 1.0.2 compatible with OpenSSL 1.1.0
  - ✓ The later was harder to implement, so we did the former
- ✓ A new OpenSSL 1.1.1 will be FIPS compatible, but we have to wait for more than a year, this is out of our control
- Even if sealing functionality already encrypts the keys that we generate, we have to have another layer of AES-ECB encryption before the key/s go out of the FIPS module













- Documentation approach
  - ✓ The FIPS 140-2 documentation was generated to comply with a Security Level 1.
- Remarkable differences
  - ✓ Type of module: Software-hybrid instead of purely software.
  - ✓ Module Block diagram: The Fipscanister.o is executed within the enclave.










- Documentation approach
  - ✓ The FIPS 140-2 documentation was generated to comply with a Security Level 1.



- ✓ Cryptographic algorithms:
  - The module removes support for: HMAC DRBG, CRT DRBG, TDES, ECDSA (FIPS 186-2), DSA (FIPS 186-4) and ECDH.
  - The module includes support for RSA with 4096 bits in length.







- Certification process and certification issues
  - ✓ The module was validated by EWA-Canada requiring some minor changes to the module and documentation.

#### **Documentation:**

- Declare the module as software-hybrid because of the use of the AES-NI instructions set.
- Specify that the module supports RSA key pair generation with 4096 bits in length but it is not CAVP tested.
- Include the HMAC SHA1 algorithm as a supported cryptographic algorithm.
- Specify the NDRNG estimated entropy generated by the module.





- Certification process and certification issues
  - ✓ The module was validated by EWA-Canada requiring some minor changes to the module and documentation:

#### Module implementation:

- The CMVP required to modify the self-test to include the RSA PKCS instead of RSA PSS.
- The CMVP required to modify the HMAC implementation to not allow the use of keys smaller than 112 bits.
- ✓ After the submission to the CMVP, the module was certified with certificate number #3672.





- Lesson learned
  - ✓ After this certification we learn two important lessons for future certifications:
    - It is necessary to pay attention to the small details such as the use of the possible use of AES-NI.
    - If the supported algorithms by OpenSSL are modified, then we need to analyze all the changes in detail.





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